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768 KoLLERT v. CuNDIFF [50 C.2d 
For the reasons above stated, I cannot concur in the philoso-
phy, the reasoning, or the law of the majority opinion. The 
judgment should be reversed. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 24930. In Bank. Sept. 19, 1958.] 
PEARL ANNA KOLLERT et al., Appellants, v. ALBERT 
FRANKLIN CUNDIFF et al., Respondents. 
[1] Automobiles-Findings and Verdict.-In an action for injuries 
arising out of a collision of vehicles at an intersection, findings 
against four children riding in the back seat of plaintiffs' car 
could be explained on the theory that they had not proved any 
substantial injuries caused by the accident where, with respect 
to three of the children, it was clear that the jury was not 
required to find under the evidence that they had been injured, 
and where, with respect to the other, concerning whom a doctor 
testified that a week after the accident he found a slight 
fracture in a finger, defendants presented evidence that X-rays 
taken after the accident showed no fracture, and the doctor 
on cross-examination acknowledged that the fracture might 
have been sustained after the accident. 
[2] !d.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.-In an action 
for injuries arising out of a collision of vehicles at an inter-
section, where the evidence would support a finding that both 
defendant driver and plaintiff driver were negligent and the 
jury might have believed that plaintiff's mother, who was rid-
ing in the car, was chargeable with plaintiff's negligence or 
that she in some degree failed to exercise due care for her own 
safety, and where erroneous instructions on contributory 
negligence of plaintiff's mother (defendants did not plead that 
she was guilty of contributory negligence), when considered 
with the evidence, might have improperly caused the jury to 
go beyond the issues pleaded and return the verdict against 
plaintiff's mother on the ground of contributory negligence, 
the erroneous instructions required that the judgment against 
plaintiff's mother be reversed. 
[3] New Trial-Affidavits-Misconduct of Jury.-Generally, affi-
davits of jurors may not be used to impeach a verdict. 
[3) See Cal.Jur.2d, New Trial, § 43 et seq.; Am.Jur., New Trial, 
§ 198. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 356; [2) Automobiles, 
§ 385-14; [3, 5, 6) New Trial, § 169(1); [4] New Trial, §§ 169(1), 
169(4). 
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[4a, 4b] !d.-Affidavits-Misconduct of Jury.-Only 
tions to the general rule that affidavits of 
used to impeach a verdict are recognized: one, to 
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the verdict was arrived at by chance (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, 
subd. 2) ; the other, that bias or disqualification of a juror 
was concealed by false answers on voir dire. 
[5] !d.-Affidavits-Misconduct of Jury.-Code Civ. Proc., § 657, 
subd. 1, providing that a verdict may be vacated for "irregu-
larity in the proceedings," does not refer to affidavits 
and may not be regarded as permitting the use of such affi-
davits in situations where they would not otherwise be proper. 
(Disapproving contrary statements in Shipley v. Permanente 
Hospital, 127 Cal.App.2d 417, 424 [274 P.2d 53].) 
[6] !d.-Affidavits-Misconduct of Jury.-In an action for injuries 
arising out of a collision of vehicles at an intersection, affi-
davits of jurors that the bailiff, on being told that the vote 
against one plaintiff was nine to three, advised the jury that 
there would be no need for further instructions since a verdict 
had been reached, that the foreman, over the protests of some 
jurors, completed the verdicts as to the remaining plaintiffs 
without further deliberation, and that the foreman, during a 
night recess, investigated traffic lights at the intersection where 
the accident occurred and made a report, which was considered 
by the jury, could not be used to impeach the verdict. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Fred Miller, Judge. Affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
Action for damages for personal ll1Juries ar1smg out of a 
collision of automobiles at an intersection. Judgment for de-
fendants against plaintiff Gertrude C. Abrahamson, reversed; 
affirmed in all other respects. 
Robert H. Lund and Floyd H. King for Appellants. 
Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee and J. H. Peckham for 
Respondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiffs have appealed from a judgment 
for defendants, contending that the court erred in instructing 
the jury and iu refusing to consider affidavits of jurors of-
fered in support of a motion for new trial to prove misconduct 
of the jury. 
The plaintiffs, Mrs. Kollert, Mrs. Abrahamson, and four 
children, were riding in a car which Mrs. Kollert was driving 
50 C.2d-25 
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when it collided with one operated by defendant Cundiff who 
was then acting in the course of his employment by defendant 
The Termo Company. Mrs. Abrahamson, who is Mrs. Kollert's 
mother, was riding in the front seat with her. Four children, 
Steven and Michael Kollert and Mary and Marlene Cleveland, 
were riding in the back seat of the car. 
The accident occurred in Long Beach at the intersection of 
Carson Avenue and Paramount Boulevard, where traffic is 
controlled by electrically operated signals. Mrs. Kollert was 
driving west on Carson in the lane nearest the center line, and, 
as she approached the intersection, there was no car in front 
of her in that lane. She testified that the signal light on 
Carson turned from red to green when she was half a block 
from the intersection, that she was driving about 20 miles an 
hour and that she did not see defendant's car until the colli-
sion occurred. A man who had been driving about 300 feet 
behind Mrs. Kollert in the lane to her right testified that the 
light was green when she entered the intersection and that 
it was still green when the accident happened. 
Cundiff was driving east on Carson, intending to make 
a left turn north into Paramount. He testified that the light 
was green as he came to the intersection and that he stopped 
even with the curb. He signaled for a left turn, moved into 
the intersection and waited for several westbound cars to 
pass. As the light changed to amber, he drove across the 
double line and saw the car driven by Mrs. Kollert, which 
was then approximately 50 feet east of the intersection, travel-
ing at about 35 miles per hour. The cars came together in 
the westbound lane nearest the center line, the right front 
part of Mrs. Kollert 's car colliding with the right front 
wheel of Cundiff's car. 
A witness who was driving the third car behind Cundiff 
and in the same lane testified that traffic at the intersection 
had stopped and that as the cars in the lane to the right began 
to move, Cundiff, starting out very fast, turned left into the 
intersection. The witness said that he noticed Mrs. Kollert 's 
car coming toward Cundiff ''at a good rate of speed,'' as 
soon as Cundiff started to move. 
There was substantial evidence to support the implied find-
ing of the jury either that Cundiff was not negligent or that 
Mrs. Kollert was guilty of contributory negligence. How-
ever, in considering whether errors, if any, had a prejudicial 
effect, it should be noted that, on both of these issues, the 
Sept.l958] KoLLERT v. CuNDIFF 
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evidence would also have warranted a finding against de-
fendants.1 
The court gave instructions which submitted the issue of 
contributory negligence to the jury not only as to Mrs. Kollert 
but also as to Mrs. Abrahamson. Defendants did not plead 
that Mrs. Abrahamson was guilty of contributory negligence, 
and they concede that the instructions were erroneous as to 
her but take the position that the error was not prejudicial. 
[1] Defendants point out that the jury found against the 
four children in the car, although it was instructed that the 
defense of contributory negligence did not apply to them, and 
they argue that the jury must have based its verdict for 
Cundiff on a conclusion that he was not negligent. The find-
ings against the children could be explained upon the theory 
that they had not proved any substantial injuries caused by 
the accident. With respect to three of the children it is clear 
that the jury was not required to find under the evidence that 
they had been injured, and it may be noted that defendants 
moved for a directed verdict as to them on this ground. 
However, defendants assert that it was conclusively estab-
lished that the other minor plaintiff had received a fractured 
finger as a result of the accident. We do not agree that 
this is so. Although a doctor testified that a week after the 
accident he found a slight fracture, defendants presented 
evidence that X-rays taken at a hospital immediately after 
the accident showed no fracture, and, on cross-examination by 
defendants, the doctor acknowledged that the fracture might 
have been sustained at some time after the accident. Thus 
the jury may have concluded that the minor plaintiffs received 
no substantial injuries and may have found against them on 
that ground. 
[2] As we have seen, the evidence would support a finding 
that both Cundiff and Mrs. Kollert were negligent. The jury 
may have believed that Mrs. Abrahamson was chargeable with 
Mrs. Kollert 's negligence or that she in some degree failed 
'At the time of the accident, July 1955, section 551 of the Vehicle 
Code provided: 
"(a) 'fhe driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn 
to the left shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from 
the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto 
as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
" (b) Said driver turning left having so yielded and having given a 
signal when and as required by this code may make such left turn and 
the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection from said 
opposite direction shall yield the right of way to the driver making the 
left turn.'' 
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to exercise due care for her own safety, and the erroneous 
instructions, when considered with the evidence, may have 
improperly caused the jury to go beyond the issues pleaded 
and return the verdict against Mrs. Abrahamson on the ground 
of contributory negligence. In these circumstances we are of 
the view that the erroneous instructions require that the judg-
ment against Mrs. Abrahamson be reversed. 
When the jurors were polled, they stood nine to three in 
favor of defendants. In support of the motion for a new trial, 
affidavits of the three dissenting jurors and of one majority 
juror were offered. The affidavits may be summarized as fol-
lovvs: 'I'he jury, taking four polls, considered the case of Mrs. 
Kollert only, and by a poll of nine to three found that both 
drivers were negligent and that Mrs. Kollert should be denied 
recovery. The bailiff was summoned for the purpose of secur-
ing additional instructions as to the remaining plaintiffs. He 
asked how the deliberations stood, and the foreman answered 
that the vote was nine to three. The bailiff then left, returned, 
and advised that there would be no need for further instruc-
tions since a verdict had been reached. Over the protest of 
some jurors the foreman completed the verdicts as to the 
remaining five plaintiffs without any further deliberation. 
Two of the affidavits stated that the foreman told the jurors 
that they would have to abide by the verdicts completed by 
him or they would never again be allowed to act as jurors. 
According to three affidavits, the foreman, during a night 
recess, had investigated the traffic lights at the intersection 
where the accident occurred, and his report on the periods 
of the signals was considered by the jury. 
[3] It is the general rule in California that affidavits of 
jurors may not be used to impeach a verdict. (See People v. 
Sutic, 41 Cal.2d 483, 495 [261 P.2d 241] (coercion of a juror 
by the others to subscribe to a verdict]; People v. Evans, 39 
Cal.2d 242, 250 [ 246 P .2d 636) (evidence received out of 
court]; People v. Gidney, 10 Cal.2d 138, 146, 147 [73 P.2d 
1186] [bailiff discussed case and probable sentence with 
jurors]; People v. Azoff, 105 Cal. 632 (39 P. 59] [evidence. 
received out of court); People v. Zelver, 135 Cal.App.2d 226, 
235-236 [287 P.2d 183] [juror "coerced" and "intimidated"· 
by other jurors]; Maffeo v. Holmes, 47 Cal.App.2d 292, 295 
( 117 P .2d 948] (independent investigation by some jurors] ; 
People v. Giminiani, 45 Cal.App.2d 535, 539 [114 P.2d 392] 
[jury informed by bailiff that a defendant had a bad reputa-
tion with the police].) 
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[ 4a] An exception to the general rule is made statute 
where "any one or more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or spce.ial verdict ... by a resort to the 
determination of chanee .... " (Code Civ. Proe., § 657, 
subd. 2.2 ) Another exception, recognized by judic.iai decision, 
is that affidavits of jurors may be used to set aside a verdict 
where the bias or disqualification of a juror was concealed by 
false answers on voir dire. (E.g., 1Y·illiams v. Bridges, 140 
Cal.App. 537 [35 P.2d 407].) 
[5] Subdivision 1 of section 657, which provides that a 
verdict may be vacated for ''irregularity in the proceedings,'' 
does not refer to jurors' affidavits and may not be regarded 
as permitting the use of such affidavits in situations where 
they would not otherwise be proper. (Of. People v. Evans, 
39 Cal.2d 242, 250 [246 P.2d 636] [rejecting a similar argu-
ment made with respect to Pen. Code. § 1181, subd. 2].) The 
statements to the contrary in Shipley v. Permanente II ospital, 
127 Cal.App.2d 417, 424 [274 P.2d 53, 48 A.L.R2d 964], are 
disapproved. 
A few jurisdictions permit a wider use of a juror's affi-
davit to impeach a verdict than has been allowed in Cali-
fornia (see Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Tel. Go., 20 Iowa 
195, 210-212; Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-150 
[ 13 S. Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917] ) , and plaintiffs urge us to relax 
the rule in this state. The problem involves the balancing 
of two eonfiieting policies. It is, of eourse, neeessary to pre-
vent instability of verdicts, fraud, and harassment of jurors, 
and, on the other hand, it is desirable to give the losing 
party relief from wrongful conduet by the jury. The eourt 
in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-269 [35 S.Ct. 783, 
59 L.Ed. 1300], after discussing these polieies and stating 
that the wrong to the individual vvas the lesser of two evils, 
2Section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part: 
''The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be modified 
or vacated, in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on all 
or part of the issues, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any 
of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such 
party: 
'' 1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party 
was prevented from having a fair trial; 
'' 2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the 
jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or 
to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort 
to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors; ... " 
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concluded that as a general rule the affidavits should be 
excluded but that there might be instances where the rule 
could not be applied without" violating the plainest principles 
of justice.'' 
[ 4b] In California, as we have seen, only two exceptions 
have been recognized, one by statute and one by judicial 
decision. [6] The present case does not come within either of 
them, and, whether or not additional exceptions may be 
justified under some circumstances, we are of the view that 
the allegations of the affidavit before us, even if taken as true, 
do not warrant a departure from the general rule. It is 
doubtful whether the conduct of the bailiff and the foreman's 
action at the' time of completing the verdicts would have 
caused persons of ordinary intelligence to acquiesce in ver-
dicts which did not represent their conclusions, and when 
the jurors were polled in open court all of them except the 
three affiants who voted for plaintiff affirmed each of the ver-
dicts as written. With respect to the foreman's visit to the 
scene of the accident and his report to the jury it is difficult 
to see how, in the light of the evidence relating to the colli-
sion, the duration of the traffic signals could have had a 
significant bearing on the outcome of the case. 
The judgment is reversed as to Mrs. Abrahamson and 
affirmed as to the other plaintiffs. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, 
J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! agree with 
the reasons given by the majority for reversing the judgment 
against Mrs. Abrahamson, but I can no longer assent to the 
dogma, so long parroted, that a juror's affidavit cannot be 
used to impeach his verdict. 
The common formula that "a juror's testimony or affidavit 
is not receivable to impeach his own verdict is not correct 
as a statement of existing law, nor is it maintainable on any 
principle in this unqualified form." "It is a mere shibboleth 
and has no intrinsic signification whatever." (8 Wigmore 
on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2345, p. 663.) 
Notwithstanding Wigmore's acute analysis disapproving the 
form in which the rule exists and the automatic application 
of it by the courts (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Com-
munications, § § 2345-2356), the practice in both aspects, un-
fortunately, remains unchanged. This persistence may, per-
Sept.1958] KoLLERT v. CuNDIFF 
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haps, be attributed to the one great difficulty with a rule 
that may be stated clearly and simply. When such a rule 
is completed and rounded, the corners smoothed and the con-
tent cohesive and coherent, it is likely to become a thing in 
itself, a work of art. It is then like a finely engineered bridge 
or a completed painting. One hates to disturb it. Even if 
knowledge and experience should demonstrate its obsolescence, 
one hates to tear it down because it has existed so long in its 
original design. I resist any such temptation aud approach 
to the law. 
The rule that a juror may not impeach his verdict is 
founded on three independent and general principles: (1) 
Privileged communications; ( 2) parol evidence rule; and ( 3) 
self-stultifying testimony. (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privi-
leged Communications, § 2345.) 
The application of the principle of privileged communica-
tions between jurors is to insure the attainment of the jurors' 
constitutional purposes. It prohibits the disclosure of com-
munications with a fellow juror upon the witness stand 
without the latter's consent. However, this principle is gen-
erally not significant primarily because what is said between 
jurors is seldom relevant at a new trial. (8 Wigmore on 
Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2346.) Moreover, 
what is disclosed in the affidavit herein is not in the nature 
of a communication. 
As for the doctrine of self-stultifying testimony, this princi-
ple forbids a juror from showing that a juror's behavior was 
not in the prescribed form which is necessary before a juror's 
actions may be valid. ( 8 \Vigmore on Evidence, Privileged 
Communications, § 2345.) It is based on the principle "nemo 
turpitudinem suam allegans audietur" (a witness shall not 
be heard to allege his own turpitude). (8 Wigmore on Evi-
dence, Privileged Communications, § 2345.) Wigmore con-
vincingly establishes that this principle no longer exists in our 
law and should not be resurrected for present purposes. ( 8 
Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, §§ 2352-
2353.) 
Therefore, the only principle on which we may validly reject 
the affidavits of the jurors herein is by the application of the 
parol evidence rule. This principle applies to the verdict of a 
jury like a will or a contract or a judgment. 
Applying this principle it is evident that a juror's motives, 
beliefs, misunderstandings, intentions, and the like are immate-
riaL The verdict is the sole embodiment of the juror's acts. 
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''The policy which requires this is the same which forbids a 
consideration of the negotiations of parties to a contract lead-
up to the final terms as deliberately embodied in the deed, 
namely, the loss of all certainty in the verdict, the impractica-
bility of for definiteness in the preliminary views, the 
risk of after disclosure of the verdict, and 
the impossibility of expecting any end to trials if the grounds 
for the verdict were allowed to effect its overthrow." ( 8 Wig-
more on Evidence, Privileged Communications,§ 2349, p. 668.) 
This rule and policy is followed in California. (Amsby v. 
Dickhouse, 4 CaL 102, 103; People v. Wyman, 15 CaL 70, 75; 
People v. Hughes, 29 Cal. 257, 258, 263; see People v. Reid, 195 
CaL 249 [232 P. 457, 36 A.LR. 1435] .) Accordingly the 
statements by the jurors in their affidavits that the foreman 
told them that they would have to abide by the verdicts com-
pleted by him or they would never again be allowed to act as 
jurors are immaterial and may properly be excluded. 
However, the policy of the parol evidence rule prohibiting 
the disclosure of a juror's motives, beliefs, misunderstandings, 
et cetera, does not compel a similar conclusion with respect to 
disclosure of irregularities and misconduct of jurors during 
their deliberations which constitute deviations from those cer-
tain formalities that are regarded as desirable policy-wise in 
the conduct of jury deliberations. The law of verdicts "must 
prescribe requisite formalities of conduct for the jurors, and 
define those informalities and irregularities which 'per se' 
invalidate the verdict. What those shall be is thus elsewhere 
in the law predetermined. The principle of the Parol Evi-
dence rule then enters and declares that the lack of such for-
malities, for this as for every other legal act (whatever the 
respective required formality may be), is always proper to 
establish as a ground for declaring the act void. Whatever 
misconduct of the jury, therefore, is an irregularity fatal to 
the verdict may always be proved.'' ( 8 Wigmore on Evidence, 
Privileged Communications, § 2352, p. 683.) 
Admittedly the distinction between motive and irregularity 
may sometimes be shadowy and difficult to perceive, but this 
offers no excuse for not attempting to remove the cloud of 
uncertainty. Moreover, it is readily apparent that a court 
by merely pronouncing the "shibboleth that a juror cannot im-
peach his verdict can never appreciate the vital distinction 
between impeaching" it by motive and impeaching it by irreg-
ular conduct. (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Commu-
nications, § 2349.) 
is correct in his deductions that the 
"'""'""""'~" '"'''uv•~::tt•~u1ng a verdict is founded on the 
behind communications and the evidence 
then this court should be to refer its rule to those 
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u"''u'"''""· what is up to attain 
and whether are worth of the 
opl.niCin leaves one in doubt as to what end is 
subserved. This doubt is to grow because of 
of in the pro-
ccc:uull':"· '' which appears in subdivision 1 of section 657 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. The declares 
that this 11 does not refer to affidavits and may 
not be the use of such affidavits in 
would not otherwise be 
In view of the heretofore the of 
the majority avoids the very the court should decide, 
i. e., do the affidavits and misconduct which 
constitute deviations from those formalities that are regarded 
as desirable in jury deliberations Y· This is a 
that has been left to the courts to work out case 
Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. 1.) After due cortsid.er~ttl 
court might well conclude that the in the affidavits 
do not state a deviation from the desired formalities, but such 
a conclusion should only be reached after careful thought. 
The court should reconsider the matter clearly forth 
its reasons. This can only be by the 
automatic formula that a juror's or affidavit not 
receivable to impeach his own verdict. 
I think the affidavits in the instant ease are sufficient to 
establish misconduct of a character justifying the impeach-
ment of the verdict and that a new trial should be granted as 
to all parties and all issues. 
